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Abstract
In 2004, French health authorities plan to introduce a prospective payment system for
hospitals delivering acute care based on the DRG classiﬁcation system. In this paper, we
analyze the consequences of this switch from a retrospective to a prospective payment system
on the ability of physicians and hospital managers to coordinate their activity in the produc-
tion of hospital stays. Our analysis follows those of Dor and Watson (1995) and Custer et al.
(1990) but is adapted to the context of the French hospital private sector. Diﬀerent types of
interactions are considered: non-cooperative, dominant-reactive, and cooperative. The main
result of this analysis is that, in a context in which average per-patient fees are maintained,
the change of payment system is potentially gainful for both partners. Although their fees
are not concerned by the reform, physicians are even in a better position than hospitals to
take advantage of the change of payment system. A minimum level of coordination is nev-
ertheless required, i.e. either cooperative or dominant-reactive interactions. Furthermore,
two elements limits the importance of these potential gains : these are only one-shot gains
and hence depend on the ability to reduce the length of hospital stays. Finally, some exten-
sions regarding competition between public and private hospitals and negotiation issues are
discussed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Following a experimental phase in 2003, a new prospective payment system known as ”Tariﬁ-
cation à l’Activité” or T2A will be implemented from 2004 in France for all kinds of hospitals
providing acute care (public, nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt). Basically, this new prospective payment
system is based on a ﬁxed payment identical for all hospital stays classiﬁed in the same Diagnosis
Related Group (DRG). If an increased competition is one of the objectives of this reform, tariﬀs
applicable to public and quasi-public hospitals on one side, and for-proﬁth o s p i t a l so nt h eo t h e r
side, will nevertheless remain initially diﬀerent.1 Furthermore, as regards to the private for-proﬁt
sector, this new payment system will only aﬀect payments related to charges supported directly
by the hospital (nursing care, use of operating rooms, drug consumption, etc.). Fee-for-services
paid to physicians working in these hospitals are not aﬀected.
This change in payment schedules is likely to have a strong direct or indirect impact for all
categories of economic agents involved (physicians, other health care professionals, hospital man-
agers, patients, health authorities). The consequences of prospective and retrospective payment
systems has been a major topic in health economics literature. A lot of works are focused on the
advantages and drawbacks of diﬀerent payment systems from a collective standpoint. In the case
demand depends on the quality of care services provided, Ma (1994), Chalkley and Malcomsom
(1998) and Mougeot (2000) have shown that the introduction of a prospective payment system
will imply productive eﬃciency (the minimization of per-patient costs) and allocative eﬃciency
(the treatment of the socially optimal number of patients). Other studies [Foster (1985), Ellis
and MacGuire (1985)] have generally determined that the incentives inherent to the prospective
payment systems will lead to either an undersupply of services or a tendency to selectively admit
low-cost cases. Finally, Newhouse (1996) points out the value of a payment system based on a
mix between a prospective and a retrospective system.
In this paper, we do not consider social optimum issues, but rather the impact of the pay-
ment system on interactions between hospital managers and physicians in the private for-proﬁt
sector. In fact, even if physicians’ fees are not directly concerned by the reform, adaptation of
private hospitals to the new payment system is actually clearly dependent on the way physi-
cians will react to the reform. Indeed, the passive role that Pauly and Redisch (1973) and Harris
(1977) assigned to management may have been a plausible assumption at the time. Currently,
managers are playing an increasingly proactive role in allocative decisions within the hospital.
With the implementation of prospective payment systems and other cost controls, hospital man-
agers and physicians may ﬁnd that they have conﬂicting interests. Analyzing hospital-physician
interactions is then essential for understanding how private hospitals, as a whole, will react to
1Further information on this reform are available on the website of the French Health Ministry
(www.sante.gouv.fr/htm/dossiers/hopital2007)
2the introduction of the new payment system.2
Custer et al. (1990) and Dor and Watson (1995) analyzed how diﬀerent payment systems
aﬀect hospital-physicians interactions. Custer et al. (1990) treated hospital-physician inter-
actions from a productive eﬃciency angle without directly taking into account the impact on
patients’ demand. Dor and Watson (1995) compared two kind of prospective payment systems:
a single fee to be shared between hospital and physicians and distinct fees for each of them.
The analysis presented here is based on these previous works but is more directly related to the
context and the questions raised by the implementation of a prospective payment system for
private hospitals in France. In order to preserve tractability and ease of exposition, we use a
simple model to analyze hospital-physician interactions.
Speciﬁcally, we study the choices of a pairing made up of a representative physician and
a hospital manager facing patient’s demand sensitive to the level of medical care, the length
of hospital stay and the level of inputs provided by the hospital. The couple also has to take
into account the constraint ﬁxed by health authorities on the number of beds available for the
hospital. We model the relationships between the physician and the hospital manager under
non-cooperative, dominant-reactive, and cooperative assumptions. These relationships are ana-
lyzed by adapting Cournot, Stackelberg, and cartel models from duopoly theory, respectively.
The results show the non-symmetric nature of the hospital-physician interaction (in some cases,
the hospital can be interested in letting the physician act as leader); the key role played by the
constraint on the number of beds (it destroys the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium); and
the clear incentives to cooperate (the sum of proﬁts is always higher in the case of cooperation).
The implementation of a DRG based prospective payment is always gainful for both the hos-
pital and the physician if the level of payment per patient is maintained with respect to the
current retrospective payment system. These are nevertheless one-time gains depending on the
conditions ﬁxed by health authorities for the new payment system. This analysis also shows the
sensitivity of the gains to the importance of the constraint on the number of beds. Finally, the
results bring out that, in the non-cooperative case, physicians are more likely to obtain rather
than to lose beneﬁts from the change of hospital payment system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented. Section 3 describes
hospital-physician interactions under the current retrospective payment system. Section 4 ana-
lyzes hospital-physician interactions under the new prospective payment system. Finally, Section
5 concludes and discusses some possible extensions.
2In a recent paper, Eggleston et al. (2001) provide a theoretical model to study how for-proﬁt, nonproﬁt, and
public providers respond to a prospective payment system in the presence of cost uncertainty.
32 The model
Following Dor and Watson (1995), our model is based on a "couple" made up of a hospital
manager and a representative physician having to coordinate their actions in order to produce
homogeneous hospital stays. This couple faces patients’ demand that is sensitive to the quality
of care provided by the physician or its level of eﬀort e, to the length of stay h and to the level
of inputs provided by the hospital q. As presented here, hospital inputs encompass both those
directly related to care (nursing care, drugs, operating rooms,...) and those improving patients’
comfort (bedding, food, ...). To take into account activity constraints (which is a key element
of the regulation of private for-proﬁt hospitals by French health authorities), we constrain the
number of available beds in the hospital.
Patients’ utility function is assumed to be additive, continuous, and concave in each of its
arguments (Eee < 0,H hh < 0,Q qq < 0):
U(e,h,q)=E(e)+H(h)+Q(q) (1)
Utility is furthermore assumed to be a strictly increasing function of the physician’s eﬀort
e and of the level of inputs provided by the hospital q. Regarding the length of stay h,w e
assume the existence of a threshold h beyond which patients’ utility begin to decrease: h =
{h ∈ R+ | Hh =0 }. In other words, patients do not appreciate stays that are either too long or
too short. All patients have the same utility function but each of them choose the hospital only
if the associated utility is equal or higher than a given threshold which is patient speciﬁc. With
a population size normalize to 1 and a threshold level uniformly distributed between U and U,





0 if U ≤ U
U(e,h,q)
U−U if U<U<U
1 if U ≥ U
(2)
In the remainder of the paper, we will consider only interior solutions (0 <D (e,h,q) < 1).
The physician controls both his eﬀort level and the length of stay. He aims at maximizing
his net income, i.e., his fees minus costs involved by his activity. His objective function is given
by the following expression:
ΠM(e,h)=D(e,h,q)[RM (e) − CM(e)] (3)
The per-patient cost CM(e) is assumed to be continuous, increasing and convex in e (CMe >
0,CM ee > 0)w i t hCM(0) = 0. Fees depend linearly on the eﬀort level : RM (e)=ree.T h i s
4speciﬁcation allows identifying a level of eﬀort e e for which the physician maximizes his per-
patient net income: e e = {e ∈ R+ | RMe = CMe}.
The hospital manager maximizes hospital’s proﬁt:
ΠH(q)=D(e,h,q)[RH (h) − CH(h)] − cqq (4)
Two kinds of costs are borne by the hospital: those related to the level of inputs that
are independent of the number of patients treated, cqq, and those that depend on the per-
patient length of stay, CH(h),d e ﬁned as a continuous, increasing and concave function (CHh >
0,CH hh < 0)w i t hCH(0) = 0. The daily cost borne by the hospital is then assumed to be
decreasing. Fees received by the hospital diﬀer according to the type of payment system. Under
the retrospective payment system, fees are deﬁned as a linear function of the length of stay:
RH(h)=rhh. Under the prospective payment system, the hospital received a ﬁxed amount for
each hospital stay: ∀h,RH(h)=RH.
Finally, the constraint imposed by health authorities on the number of available beds in the
hospital (LH)i sd e ﬁned as follows:
hD(e,h,q) ≤ LH (5)
3 The retrospective payment system
Hospital-physician interactions refers to the way the two partners behave and, more speciﬁcally,
their ability (or not) to cooperate in the production of hospital stays. We investigate these two
diﬀerent situations by means of several equilibrium concepts.
3.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Within a non-cooperative framework, diﬀerent equilibrium concepts can be considered. The
most usual one is the Cournot equilibrium, i.e., the situation in which both players choose
the actions simultaneously and, therefore, each player considers the action chosen by the other
player as given when making its own decision. But one can consider the situation in which the
players choose the actions sequentially. In that case, the player who chooses ﬁrst (the leader)
is able to inﬂuence the decision of the other player (the follower). At ﬁrst, it seems diﬃcult to
know if the physician or the hospital manager is in a better position to be the leader. This will
depend on the local environment and the degree of scarcity of physicians and private hospitals
in a given region. In addition to Cournot equilibrium, we will also analyze (1) the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the hospital manager acting as leader and (2) the Stackelberg equilibrium with
the physician acting as leader.
53.1.1 Cournot equilibrium
In the case of Cournot equilibrium, physician optimization problem is given by :
Max
e,h
ΠM(e,h)=D(e,h,q)[RM (e) − CM(e)]
s.t. hD(e,h,q) ≤ LH (λcp)
(6)
First-order conditions associated to this optimization program are:
De [RM − CM − λcph]+D[RMe − CMe]=0 (7)
Dh [RM − CM − λcph] − λcpD =0 (8)
If the bed constraint is not binding (λcp =0 ), the physician maximizes his net income by
choosing the length of stay b hc considered as optimal by the patients (b hc = h ⇐⇒ Dh =0 ). The
trade-oﬀ between marginal income and marginal cost leads the physician to adopt a level of
eﬀort b ec which is higher than the one which maximizes the per-patient net income (b ec > e e ⇐⇒
RMe − CMe < 0).
In the case in which the bed constraint is binding (λcp > 0) conversely, it is clearly detrimental
for the physician. It makes him reduce both the length of stay and eﬀort level and has a negative
impact on his net income.
Hospital optimization problem is deﬁned as follows:
Max
q ΠH(q)=D(e,h,q)[RH (h) − CH(h)] − cqq
s.t. hD(s,h,q) ≤ LH (λch)
(9)
leading to the following ﬁrst-order condition:
Dq
h
RH − CH − λchh
i
− cq =0 (10)
If the bed constraint is non binding (λch =0 ), the hospital chooses a level of inputs b qc such
that the marginal cost of inputs, cq, equals the marginal income per-patient stay, Dq [RH − CH].
If the bed constraint is binding, the hospital’s choice is completely dictated by the constraint.
This corresponds to a situation in which Dq [RH − CH] >c q.I nt h i sc a s e ,b qc will be given by
hD = LH. The bed constraint therefore is detrimental for both hospital and physician. More
generally, we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Bed constraint imposed by health authorities destroys Cournot equilibrium unique-
ness. In this situation, the one making a choice ﬁrst implicitly determines his partner’s choices.
Therefore, there is a strong incentive either to cooperate or to act as a leader.
6Since the bed constraint is borne jointly by the two partners, the system of equations to
be solved for determining the Cournot equilibrium is under-identiﬁed: ﬁve variables have to be
determined
n
b ec,b hc, b qc,λcp,λch
o
with the help of four equations ((7), (8), (10), and (5)).
In the case the constraint is binding, the follower could be forced to accept the worst of the
possible Cournot equilibria.
3.1.2 Stackelberg equilibrium: hospital leadership
The main problem for the hospital manager is that length of stay, i.e. the key variable for the
hospital, is under physician control. By acting as a leader, the hospital manager can choose the
level of inputs that will make the physician adopting the length of stay that maximizes hospital’s
proﬁt. However, in the case of a non binding constraint, the only concern of the physician acting
as a follower is to choose the length of stay that maximizes patients’ satisfaction (see condition
(8)). In this situation, the hospital manager can only aﬀect physician’s level of eﬀort. Therefore,
we should analyze two diﬀerent cases, ﬁrst when the constraint on the number of beds is binding
or, second, when it is not.
Proposition 2 In the case the bed constraint is binding, the hospital manager acting as leader
chooses the greatest level of inputs that makes the physician adopting the longest length of stay
he is willing to accept, i.e., the one maximizing patients’ satisfaction h.
Since a binding constraint is characterized by D =
LH
h , the variation of the hospital’s proﬁt









With CH(h) being concave and null for h =0 , this implies that CH(h) − hCHH > 0.
Moreover, with respect to the bed constraint, this implies that
dq
dh = −D+hDh
hDq < 0.F o r e a c h
positive h,w eh a v edΠH
dh > 0. But the physician when acting as follower, will never accept a
length of stay higher than h the threshold beyond which patients’ utility start decreasing . So, h
represents the highest length of stay achievable for the hospital. In order to make the physician
adopting h, the hospital should lead the physician to a situation in which the physician considers
the bed constraint as non-binding. For this purpose, the hospital should reduce his level of inputs.
Once the bed constraint becomes no more binding for the physician, the hospital has no more
interest to reduce further his input level because in this situation Dq[RH − CH] >c q.T h e
hospital then chooses the greatest input level b qlh such that the physician will choose b hlh = h.
In this situation, the optimization conditions are as follows:
7De [RM − CM]+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (12)
Dh =0 (13)
hD = LH (14)
This situation is quite diﬀerent when the bed constraint is no longer binding, since a decrease
in q does not impact h. So, the hospital can only beneﬁt from an increase of e. From condition
(7), it can be shown that de




De)[RH − CH]=cq (15)
Comparing conditions (10) and (15) we can see that the hospital manager chooses a level of
inputs less than the one associated to Cournot equilibrium, b qlh < b qc.
3.1.3 Stackelberg equilibrium: physician leadership
Just as the aim of the hospital manager when acting as leader is to reduce its inputs and to let
the physician take on the majority of the eﬀort for increasing demand, the aim of the physician,
when acting as leader, is to induce the hospital to increase its inputs to meet the positive impact
on demand. Nevertheless, the hospital only increases its inputs if marginal beneﬁt is higher than
marginal costs. The hospital reaction function can then be derived from (10) and is given by:
∀e,h, RC(e,h)={q | Dq [RH − CH]=cq} (16)





First-order conditions associated with the physician’s optimization problem are the following:
De
h
RM − CM − λlph
i






RM − CM − λlph
i
− λlpD =0 (18)
First, we analyze physician behavior when the bed constraint is not binding (λlp =0 ). Since
dRC
dh > 0, a comparison between (18) and (8) concludes that physician will adopt a length of
stay higher than h in order to beneﬁt from an increase in q (b hlp > b hc and b qlp > b qc). Compared
to the Cournot equilibrium, the increase in both h and q implies an increase in demand. This
increase allows the physician to reduce his level of eﬀort (condition (17) is similar to condition
(7) but is characterized now by a higher demand). The physician therefore comes closer to e e
(i.e., b ec > b elp > e e).
8When the bed constraint becomes binding, the mechanisms through which the physician
takes advantage of its leadership are the same as in the case the constraint is not binding, but
the consequences on demand are diﬀerent.
Proposition 3 When acting as leader, the physician accepts a higher length of stay in order to
make the hospital increase its level of inputs. As a consequence, the physician is able to reduce
his level of eﬀort. When the bed constraint is binding, this implies a decrease in demand .
Combining condition (17) and condition (18) when λlp 6=0leads to the following equation :
LH
LH + Dh + dRC
dh Dq
De [RM − CM]+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (19)
This equation is quite similar to the one obtained when combining condition (7) and condition
(8) in the corresponding Cournot equilibrium:
LH
LH + Dh
De [RM − CM]+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (20)
It is clear from the comparison of these two equations that being the leader means the physician
must be aware of the impact of h on q (dRC
dh Dq). As a consequence, the physician will be less






Moreover, if the bed constraint is binding (LH = hD) and at equilibrium we observe a higher
length of stay, then the demand has to be lower. Nevertheless, even if there is an incentive
towards a lower e and a higher h and q, since the presence of the bed constraint destroys Cournot
equilibrium uniqueness, it remains diﬃcult to make a direct comparison between
n




b elp,b hlp, b qlp
o
.
It is interesting to note that even if it is always better to be leader than follower, the hospital
has more to gain from being a follower than the physician. Clearly, when the number of available
beds is not binding, the hospital situation is better when the physician acts as a leader than in
Cournot equilibrium, since the length of stay and the demand are higher. Similarly, when the
bed constraint is binding, the physician can only take advantage from his leadership by oﬀering a
length of stay considered as more favorable by the hospital. In other words, being leader for the
physician means to be aware that, to a certain extent, he could beneﬁt from improving hospital’s
situation. Cooperation remains nevertheless a better way to take advantage from internalizing
the externalities than trying to exert a leadership on his partner.
3.2 Cooperative equilibrium
When the couple hospital-physician decides to cooperate in order to maximize joint proﬁts, the




ΠM + ΠH = D(e,h,q)[RM (e) − CM(e)+RH (h) − CH(h)] − cqq
s.t. hD(s,h,q) ≤ LH (λco)
(21)
First-order conditions are given by:
De [RM − CM + RH − CH − λcoh]+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (22)
Dh [RM − CM + RH − CH − λcoh]+[ RHh − CHh − λco]D =0 (23)
Dq [RM − CM + RH − CH − λcoh] − cq =0 (24)
Since cooperation means that each partner makes additional eﬀorts in order to increase joint
proﬁts, it can be shown that:
Proposition 4 When the bed constraint is not binding, cooperative equilibrium is characterized
by stronger physician eﬀort, longer length of stay and greater level of hospital inputs compared
to Cournot equilibrium.
When the bed constraint is not binding the cooperative equilibrium is deﬁned by conditions
(22), (23), (24) with λco =0and the Cournot equilibrium by conditions (7), (8), (10) with
λc =0 . Comparing conditions (23) and (8), we can observe that since [RHh − CHh] > 0 then
b hco > h = b h. Furthermore, when comparing (24) with (10) we have that [RM − CM + RH −
CH] > [RH − CH] and then b qco > b qc. Finally, comparing (22) with (7) we have [RM − CM +
RH − CH] > [RM − CM] which implies b eco > b ec.
Comparison between cooperative equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibria is less obvious.
What is clear is that the leader always make more eﬀort in the cooperative equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium, especially on the variables costly for him (i.e., the level of eﬀort for
the physician and the level of inputs for the hospital). On the other hand, it is more diﬃcult to
determine whether length of stay will be longer or shorter in the cooperative equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium. For example, hospital leadership implies a length of stay remaining
equal to h even if the bed constraint is binding. In the cooperative equilibrium the length of
stay is higher than h for low levels of constraint (λco <R H h − CHh), and lower than h when
the number of beds makes the constraint more binding (λco >R H h − CHh).
More generally, conditions deﬁning each of the equilibrium considered allows to show that n
















b ec,b hc, b qc
o
when Cournot
equilibrium is well deﬁned (i.e. constraint is not binding). Moreover, the convexity of the opti-
mization programs associated to the cooperative equilibrium ensures uniqueness of
n
b eco,b hco, b qco
o
.
Since cooperation implies maximizing the sum of physician and hospital proﬁts, it becomes clear
10that d ΠM
co +d ΠH
co is strictly greater than d ΠM
lp +d ΠH
lp, d ΠM
lh + d ΠH
lp and , d ΠM
c +d ΠH
c . This simply conﬁrms,
within the context of our model, the general result deﬁning that when interactions between play-
ers are characterized by externalities (implied here by the joint production of hospital stays),
cooperation is always gainful.
The ability to cooperate however raises the question of how gains associated to cooperation
are to be shared. The value of cooperating rather than being leader or follower is also directly
related to this question. Sharing out of gains associated to cooperation can be analyzed using
Nash bargaining solutions. Although this kind of analysis is planned as an extension of the
present work on hospital-physician interactions, we will not go further on this point here in order
to focus more directly on the consequences of the switch from a retrospective to a prospective
payment system.
4 The prospective payment system
Consequences of the implementation of a prospective payment system depend on the type of
behavior adopted by the physician and the hospital manager. We analyze below these conse-
quences for each of the equilibria identiﬁed in the previous section: Cournot, Stackelberg and
cooperative. Whatever the equilibrium considered, the consequences can be divided into two
categories: those directly related to a modiﬁcation of the behavior involved by the switch from a
retrospective to a prospective payment system, and those only related to an overall improvement
or worsening of the ﬁnancial conditions supporting physicians and hospital activities. Since we
a r eo n l yi n t e r e s t e di nt h eﬁrst type of consequences, we consider a change in the payment system
that does not modify hospital and physician proﬁts when the choices of e, h and q are unchanged
by the switch to a prospective payment system. The fee perceived by the hospital for each stay
under the new prospective payment system RH is then assumed to be identical to the mean
per-patient payment received by the hospital in the previous equilibrium situation under the
retrospective payment system (e.g., in the case of Cournot equilibrium, RH = RH(b hc)).
4.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
4.1.1 Cournot equilibrium
As already mentioned above, the Cournot equilibrium is only well deﬁned when the bed con-
straint is not binding. Consequences of the introduction of a prospective payment system can
only be considered in this situation.
Proposition 5 The Cournot equilibrium, in the absence of a binding constraint, is not aﬀected
by the introduction of a prospective payment system.
11Under the prospective payment system, the optimization conditions associated to Cournot
equilibrium in the absence of a binding constraint are given by:
De [RM − CM]+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (25)





− cq =0 (27)
Since we assume RH = RH(b hc), conditions (25), (26) and (27) are equivalent to conditions
(7), (8) and (10) with λc =0 . Then, b hc = h = b h
p
c, b ec = b e
p
c,a n db qc = b q
p
c, where the upperscript
”p” reﬂects imposition of the prospective payment system.
The main consequence of the prospective payment system for the hospital is the ability to
reduce the length of stay and the associated costs while keeping fees unchanged. Nevertheless,
the length of stay is controlled by the physician and not by the hospital. Taking advantage of
the prospective payment system, therefore requires more ”active” behavior from at least one of
the partner than the ones associated to the Cournot equilibrium.
4.1.2 Stackelberg equilibrium: hospital leadership
As shown in the previous section, leadership for the hospital essentially means inducing the
physician to increase the length of stay. Contrary to the retrospective payment system, the
incentive to increase the length of stay becomes unclear under the prospective payment system.
Proposition 6 The Hospital can only take advantage of the prospective payment system if the
constraint is binding. In that case, if the advantage associated to the reduction of the costs
related to the length of stay and to the increased demand are not compensated by the increase
of the costs associated to the required augmentation of inputs, the hospital, acting as leader, will
try to obtain from the physician a decrease in the length of stay (b h
p
lh < b hlh = h).
When the bed constraint is not binding, the variation of q has no impact on the choice of
the length of stay by the physician. The hospital is therefore unable to make physician reducing
the length of stay.
When the constraint is binding, any increase in q leads the physician to reduce both e and
h: condition (7) implies de
dq < 0 and condition (8) implies dh
dq < 0. The hospital will, however,
modify its level of inputs only if its proﬁtable. This proﬁtability can be assessed with the help













If, under the retrospective payment system, it has been shown that ∀h, dΠH
dh > 0, under the
prospective payment system the sign of dΠH
dh is ambiguous: LH
h2
£
CH(h) − hCHH − RH
¤
< 0,
12but with respect to the bed constraint, it implies that, −
dq
dhcq > 0. In other words, the value
for the hospital of an increase of h depends of the trade-oﬀ between the augmentation of costs
related to h and the corresponding smaller demand on the one hand, and the reduction in input
costs on the other hand. Two cases are to be considered:
- dΠH
dh remains positive for each h ≤ h. In this case the best achievable length of stay for the
hospital is h. The equilibrium is then characterized by b h
p
lh = h = b hlh, b q
p
lh = b qlh and b e
p
lh = b elh;
that is, the same equilibrium as for the retrospective payment system.
- The length of stay such that dΠH
dh =0is lower than h. Compared to the retrospective
payment system, the hospital manager acting as leader will increase its inputs (b q
p
lh > b qlh)i n
order to obtain by the responding physician a reduction in both e and h: b h
p
lh < b hlh = h,
b e
p
lh < b elh.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e b h
p
lh < b hlh and since the bed constraint has to be respected, we will
observe an increase in demand.
It is interesting to note that the hospital can only take advantage of the prospective payment
system by improving the physician situation: when the new equilibrium diﬀers from the previous
one (in the retrospective system), it is characterized by a lower level of physician eﬀort and an
increase in demand. This result is a direct consequence to the fact that the physician controls
the key variable to obtain some advantages from the implementation of the prospective payment
system: the length of stay.
Another element which has to be mentioned is that, in the case of a binding constraint, the
reduction of the length of stay implies an increase in demand and therefore an increase of the
required budget for funding the hospital and physician’s activities. If the health authorities are
not willing to accept such an increase, potential advantages associated to the introduction of
the prospective payment system could seriously wane or even disappear.
4.1.3 Stackelberg equilibrium: physician leadership
As in the previous section, results presented below derive from the fact that, since the physician
controls the length of stay (the key variable as regards prospective payment consequences), he
is in a good situation to take advantage of the new payment system.
Proposition 7 Whenever the bed constraint is or is not binding, the physician takes advantage
of the prospective payment system through an increase in demand by letting the hospital beneﬁt
from a shorter length of stay. In regards to its own level of eﬀort, he can accept an increase but
only in some cases when the bed constraint is binding.
As in the retrospective payment system, the objective of the physician, when acting as leader,
is to make the hospital increase the level of its inputs in order to beneﬁt from the corresponding
13increase in demand. The hospital reaction function is given by:
∀e,h, RC(e,h)={q | Dq [RH − CH]=cq} (29)




Dqq(RH−CH) < 0.C o n t r a r y
to the retrospective case, an increase of length of stay reduces the level of inputs that the hospital
























In the case the bed constraint is not binding (λ
p
lp =0 ), condition (31) will be satisﬁed only if
Dh > 0,g i v e nt h a tdRC
dh < 0. So, at equilibrium, we have a length of stay shorter than the length
of stay at the Cournot equilibrium and, therefore, shorter than the length of stay corresponding
to the retrospective case, i.e., b h
p
lp < h<b hlp. Moreover, from the hospital reaction function, we
can see that, at equilibrium, b q
p
lp > b qlp. Although the variations of h and q are of diﬀerent sign,
the impact on demand should be positive. Otherwise, the physician could decide not to modify
the length of stay when facing the new prospective system. Finally, the greater demand will let
the physician providing a smaller eﬀort b e
p
lp < b elp.
In the case the bed constraint is binding (λ
p
lp > 0), condition (31) will be satisﬁed only if
Dh > 0,g i v e nt h a tdRC









> 0 if and
only if (Dh+ dRC
dh Dq) > 0.A n d(Dh+ dRC
dh Dq) > 0 if and only if Dh > 0. Therefore, we also have
t h ec a s et h a tb h
p
lp < h<b hlp. Given that dRC
dh < 0, the level of inputs provided by the hospital
will be b q
p
lp > b qlp. Moreover, given that the constraint on the number of beds should be satisﬁed
under both the retrospective and the prospective payment system, the impact on demand of
the reduction of h and the increase of q should be positive. For a constant level of LH = hD,
the reduction of h (b h
p
lp < b hlp) implies a higher demand after the introduction of a prospective
payment system.
Substituting the expression for λ
p
lp obtained from (31) in condition (30) and taking into
account the constraint on the number of beds, we can rewrite (30) as follows:
LH
LH + Dh + dRC
dh Dq
De [RM − CM]+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (32)
Knowing the equilibrium eﬀort of the physician, we should compare the expression above
with a similar expression under the retrospective payment system. With a higher demand in
t h ep r o s p e c t i v ec a s ea n dk n o w i n gt h a tdRC
dh < 0, while in the retrospective case dRC
dh > 0,t h e
physician’s level of eﬀo r ta te q u i l i b r i u mb e
p
lp could be greater or smaller than b elp.I ne i t h e rc a s e ,
the physician’s proﬁt increases as a result of the introduction of the prospective payment system.
144.2 Cooperative equilibrium
The consequences of the prospective payment system on Stackelberg equilibria can be sketched
out as situations in which the hospital wants to beneﬁt from advantages associated to a reduction
of lengths of stay (implying cost savings without impacting incomes). But since the length of stay
is controlled by the physician, the hospital has to oﬀer the physician an increase in demand.
This kind of trade-oﬀ is no longer required when the physician and the hospital are able to
cooperate.
Proposition 8 Whenever the bed constraint is or not binding, the implementation of the prospec-
tive payment system induces a reduction of the length of stay. Contrary to the previous cases,
demand only increases when the bed constraint is binding. When the constraint is not binding,
the impact on demand is ambiguous.
In the case when the hospital and the physician decide to cooperate and choose the level
of eﬀort e, the length of stay h and the level of inputs q that maximizes the joint proﬁts, the
optimization conditions are the following:
De
£
RM − CM + RH − CH − λp
coh
¤
+[ RMe − CMe]D =0 (33)
Dh
£
RM − CM + RH − CH − λp
coh
¤




RM − CM + RH − CH − λp
coh
¤
− cq =0 (35)
Conditions deﬁning the cooperative equilibrium under the retrospective system (22), (23),
(24) and under the retrospective payment system (33), (34), (35) diﬀer only by the term RHhD
appearing in the left hand side of condition (34). Since RHhD is positive and the left hand side
of (34) is decreasing in h, it is clear that b h
p
co < b hco
When the bed constraint is binding, a decrease in h i sc o m p e n s a t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nd e m a n d
(hD = LH) The switch from a retrospective to a prospective system then necessary implies a
increase in demand.
The situation is a slightly diﬀerent when the bed constraint is not binding (λp
co =0 ). The left
hand side of condition (34) is negative for equilibrium values corresponding to the retrospective
system b eco, b hco and b qco. Therefore, to satisfy condition (34), the length of stay should be
b h
p
co < b hc = h<b hco. With the reduction in h we have that CH decreases while RH remains
the same. So, the term
£
RM − CM + RH − CH
¤
increases. In this case, condition (35) will be
satisﬁed only if Dq decreases, i.e., only if the level of inputs b q
p
co > b qco > b qc. However, the impact
on D of the reduction in h and the increase in q is ambiguous. If D decreases, condition (33) will
be satisﬁed if the level of eﬀort b e
p
co > b eco.B u ti fD increases, and depending on the increase of
£
RM − CM + RH − CH
¤
,t h ee ﬀort level satisfying condition (33) b e
p
co can be smaller or bigger
than b eco.
15This result derives from the fact that, in a cooperative situation, the physician does not
have to obtain a direct beneﬁt through an increase in demand for reducing the length of stay
following the implementation of the prospective payment system.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The main result of this analysis is related to potential gains associated to the implementation
of a prospective payment system. Although this new payment system only aﬀects hospital fees,
there are potential gains for both private hospitals and physicians working in these hospitals.
These gains are involved by the possibility, under the prospective payment system, to shorten
hospital stays for obtaining cost savings without suﬀering any income reduction. Since the length
of stay is a variable under physicians’ control, taking advantage of this possibility requires not
only a minimum level of coordination but also that both partners have something to gain from
it.
In fact, physicians are in a better position than hospital managers to beneﬁt from the new
payment system: if they consider that there is nothing to gain, the switch to the new payment
system will have no impact. For example, the case in which the hospital manager is leader
and the bed constraint is not binding corresponds to this situation. As regards coordination,
cooperation is obviously the best way to achieve it since it ensures maximization of joint proﬁts.
Leadership of one of the two partners is nevertheless enough to obtain the minimum level of
coordination required for the change in payment system to be gainful for both hospital and
physicians.
Before discussing the likelihood of eﬀects shown with our model, it has to be reminded
that our results refers to a context in which average per-patient fees perceived by hospitals are
not aﬀected by the implementation of the prospective payment system. This derives from the
fact that we are interested in behavioral consequences of the new system, not in consequences
related to an overall improvement or worsening of reimbursement conditions provided by health
authorities. It can nevertheless be claimed that these results also apply to other situations:
an overall modiﬁcation of reimbursement conditions does not, by itself, eliminate potential
gains associated to the switch from a retrospective to a prospective payment system. Such a
modiﬁcation will essentially impact on the importance of these gains.
Besides issues related to reimbursement levels granted by health authorities, several argu-
ments can be put forward to consider that potential gains associated to a prospective payment
system remain limited. The ﬁrst is related to the one-time nature of these gains. Once the new
system is implemented, it clearly oﬀers less margin for hospitals to increase their income: hospi-
tal income becomes only dependent of the number of patients treated and not on the length and
content of stay. This is the kind of eﬀect observed following the implementation of a prospective
16payment system for Medicare in USA: the slower increase in hospital costs due to a reduction of
length of stay has been only temporary [See Rosko and Broyles (1987), and Antel et al. (1995)].
The second argument is that these gains are directly related to the ability to decrease the
length of stay. The trend towards decreasing average length of stays in private hospitals is quite
old (8.4 days in 1985, 5.0 days in 2000 for stays related to acute care3). Private hospitals have
also largely developed ambulatory surgery (in 1998, more than 80% of the ambulatory surgeries
were carried out by private for-proﬁth o s p i t a l s 4). As shown by our model, these trends can be
related to activity constraints which creates an incentive to reduce the length of stay. Given
reductions already made, even if a prospective payment system creates additional incentives, it
is unclear that private hospitals will be able to signiﬁcantly decrease the length of stay further.
The 15% reduction in the length of stay during the ﬁrst 3 years derived from Medicare experience
in the early eighties (See Folland et al.(2001)) cannot be regarded as a reference point for what
may occur in the French case as the period of time and the context are clearly diﬀerent.
Furthermore, gains derived from the prospective payment system are, in most cases, related
to an increase in demand, notably because in a non-cooperative context that is the only incentive
for physicians to decrease lengths of stay. This increase in demand is clearly positive from the
patients’ viewpoint since it is a consequence of an improvement of their satisfaction. But, it
also implies an increase in the funding level which has to be, implicitly or explicitly, accepted
by health authorities.
Regarding this point, it has to be mentioned that we limited our analysis to interactions
between physicians and hospital managers in the private sector. We then implicitly consider
that the switch to the new payment system takes place in a stable environment. In fact, since
all hospitals are concerned by the new payment system, even if the couple hospital-physician
modiﬁes its choices following the implementation of the new system, the impact on demand
remains unclear. This is one of the main limitations of the analysis presented here and why we
plan to extend our model.
The analysis presented here constitutes, in fact, a ﬁrst step of an analysis of the consequences
of the implementation of a prospective payment system in France. The ﬁrst direction in which we
have already begun to extend the work achieved is related to the impact of a prospective payment
system on competition between public and private hospitals. Clearly, one of the main concerns
of both public and private sector regarding the new payment system is related to competition
issues. While private hospitals view the new payment system rather favorably if it really involves
3Data reported in Ecosante 2002 database. The same trend is observed in public and public-like hospitals but
with a lower slope (8.7 days in 1985, 5.9 days in 2000).
4SAE data
17more direct competition across sectors5, public hospitals point out that speciﬁcities linked to
their public status make it necessary to maintain diﬀerences in the treatment of the two sectors.
The choice made by health authorities, at least initially, is maintaining diﬀerences in tariﬀs
applicable to the two sectors. Tariﬀs constitute however only one side of competition, the other
one is market sharing among suppliers. Regarding this second element, our analysis shows the
key role played by activity constraints on the hospital-physician relationships and how these
constraints lean importantly on their choices. So, the impact of the new payment system on
competition between sectors not only depends on tariﬀs but also on its indirect consequences
on activity constraints in the private sector. In other words, under a retrospective system, bed
constraints and, more generally, activity constraints helped health authorities limit the rise of
expenditures in the private sector. Such constraints becoming less useful under a prospective
payment system, their disappearance may have an indirect but signiﬁcant impact on competition
across sectors.
Another extension of the model is related to the negotiation of gains associated with coopera-
tion. Results presented here regarding cooperation conﬁrms a well-known result: full cooperation
is always the best way to maximize the sum of gains obtained by all the players in the presence
of externalities. This result however gives no information on the value of cooperation for each
partner. Dor and Watson (1995) addressed this question using the Nash bargaining solution.
These authors showed that in order to obtain, through negotiation, outcomes identical to those
corresponding to full cooperation, players must not only agree on a rule for sharing gains but
they also should agree on a desirable level for each decision variable. Dor and Watson (1995)
expressed doubts on the possibility of a negotiation of the level of eﬀort made by the physician.
This diﬃculty also clearly applies in the French case.
A third extension refers to the number of hospitals and physicians considered in our model.
As in Dor and Watson (1995), our analysis is focused on a couple made of a hospital and
a representative physician. One may argue than considering several physicians rather than a
representative one would have been more relevant. In fact, by itself, the number of physicians
working in a hospital does not modify the nature of interactions between a manager controlling
hospital inputs and physicians controlling the length of stays and their own level of eﬀorts [See
Custer et al. (1990) for an analysis on hospital- physician interactions in the presence of several
physicians]. On that point, it is rather the degree of scarcity of hospital facilities on the one
hand, and the degree of scarcity of physicians in a given region on the other hand which are
crucial regarding the ability of each partner to impose its will. Considering both hospital and
physician leaderships allows us to examine the two possible extreme situations.
5More information on the position of private hospitals on the reform can be found at the following website :
www.fhp.fr
18Finally, regarding the number of physicians, it may have been interesting to make a distinc-
tion between prescribers (e.g. internists) and prescribed physicians (e.g. radiologists). Incentives
associated to the introduction of a prospective payment system aﬀecting their fees are clearly
diﬀerent for these two categories of physicians. However, since the prospective payment system
only concerns fees paid to the hospital, making this distinction among physicians appears less
crucial.
References
[1] Antel J. J., Ohsfeld R. L., Bexxer E. R, 1995, State regulation and hospital colts The
Review of economics and statistics, vol 77, n◦ 3, août 1995.
[2] Chalkley M. and J.M. Malcomson, 1998, Contracting for health services with unmonitored
quality, Economic Journal, 108, 1093-1110.
[3] Custer W.S., J.W. Moser, R.A. Musacchio, R.J. Willke, 1990, The production of health
care services and changing hospital reimbursement — The rôle of hospital-medical staﬀ
relationships, Journal of Health Economics, 9 : 167-192The First Part
[4] Dor A., H. Watson, 1995, The hospital-physician interaction in U.S. hospitals : evolving
payment schemes and their incentives, European Economic Review, 39-3/4 : 795-802.
[5] Eggleston K., N. Miller and R. Zeckhauser, 2001, Ownership structure and provider behav-
ior, mimeo.
[6] Ellis R.P. and T.G. McGuire, 1985, Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement,
Journal of Health Economics, 4, 129-151.
[7] Folland S, Goodman A, Stano M, 2001 The Economics of Health and Health Care (3rd
edition) Prentice Hall ed, Chapter 20 : Goverment interventions in healh care markets., .
[8] Foster R.N., 1985, Cost-shifting under cost reimbursement and prospective payment, Jour-
nal of Health Economics, 4, 261-271.
[9] Harris J.E., 1977, The internal organization of hospitals: Some economic implications, Bell
Journal of Economics 8, 467-482
[10] Ma C.A. , 1994, Health care payment systems: cost and quality incentives, Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 3-1, 93-112.
[11] Mougeot M., 2000, La tariﬁcation hospitalière: de l’enveloppe globale à la concurrence par
comparaison, Annales d’Economie et Statistiques,58,195-213.
19[12] Newhouse J.P., 1996, Reimbursing health plans and health providers : selection versus
eﬃciency in production, Journal of Economic Literature, 34, pp 1236-1263.
[13] Pauly M.V. and M. Redisch, 1973, The not-for-proﬁt hospital as a physicians’ cooperative,
American Economic Review 63, 87-99.
[14] Rosko MD, Broyles RW.Short-term responses of hospitals to the DRG prospective pricing
mechanism in New Jersey. Med Care. 1987 Feb;25(2):88-99.
20